Learning as a social and collaborative process

Reinforcing the idea of mutuality is the idea of learning as a social process. The idea of learning as a social and collaborative process sits strangely on our traditionally competitive Western education system, with its emphasis on detachment and distance. When the social context of learning is recognized, and collaboration is valued rather than penalized, the significance of relationship in learning makes sense, prioritizing involvement and connection, nurturing joint endeavours and stimulating the creativity of constructed knowledge.

Relationship in traditional adult education and learning has emphasized separateness and isolation, causing learners to be ‘estranged’ from each other, their teacher, and the material ideas they seek to learn about (Radley, 1980: 34). As non-participants in the process, learners have been presented with their subject as the teacher’s ‘product’, often an alien ‘buffet of ideas’ (Radley, 1980: 40) and quite foreign to the student learner.

When relationship replaces estrangement, and learning is recognized as having implications in the realm of ideas, values, social interests and assumptions, then learning becomes ‘the expression of a social system… which is grounded in the ways in which student and teacher together work with their material’ (Radley, 1980: 36), suggesting connection between facilitator and learner and, we would add, learner and learner.

Belenky et al (1986) differentiate connected learning from separated knowing with reference to the deep relationships that characterize the former (1986: 115) in contrast to the detachment of the latter. Connected learning recognizes the significance of relationship as learners jointly construct knowledge for themselves and each other.

The learner as a model of ‘abundance’ rather than ‘deficiency’
Implied from what has been stated so far is the idea of individuals being resources of abundance that can be drawn upon to further learning. This is in contrast to the deficiency model of the individual being an ‘empty bucket to be filled’. The former model begins with an openness to abundance, an assumption that the learner already possesses in abundance what is needed for learning. In this model, given the opportunity, space and encouragement, learning will happen.

Thus in action learning set members bring their whole experience to the set as a resource to be applied to the issue presented by the presenting set member. Belenky et al (1986: 190ff) contrast stances taken by two college professors and their impact via stories told by two women who had each experienced one of the professors. The first professor, introducing a science class, asked the students to guess how many beans a jar contained. After a host of inaccurate answers he gave the ‘right’ answer and added: ‘You have just learned an important lesson about science.

Never trust the evidence of your own senses.’ The effect destroyed the confidence of the student who left and did not return to science for years, having had her notion of first-hand experience trashed. In the second example a philosophy professor put a cube on the table and asked what it was. In response to its being called a cube, she asked what a cube was. The response brought forth that a cube contained six equal square sides. ‘But how do you know? We can’t exactly see six sides, can we, when we look, yet you know it’s a cube.

You invent the sides you cannot see. You use your intelligence to create the “truth” about cubes.’ The contrast between the approaches of the two professors is interesting. The science professor, in a benign way, wanted to teach students that experience is a source of error. In isolation this had the effect of rendering the student dumb and dependent.

The philosophy student’s lesson was that although raw experience is insufficient, by reflecting upon it the student arrived at a truth. It did not diminish but enhanced her self-esteem and built upon her lived experience. The latter is the basis of action learning from the outset, that a set member is resourceful rather than resource empty; abundant rather than deficient. An action learning set unlocks (and sometimes unblocks) the experience that people bring with them. In addition, a set will also surface prior tacit learning.
Read More : Learning as a social and collaborative process

The role of empathy in social entrepreneurship

While commercial and social entrepreneurship have much in common, one of the most important differences is the nature of the entrepreneurial opportunity (Austin et al., 2006). Whereas commercial entrepreneurial opportunities are focused on the creation of economic value, social entrepreneurship opportunities are focused on the creation of social value – that is, some form of societal improvement.

As a result, the decision process for prospective commercial and social entrepreneurs is likely to be infl uenced by diff erent factors. In developing a theory of entrepreneurial action, McMullen and Shepherd (2006) explain the decision to act upon identified entrepreneurial opportunities is a function of the feasibility and desirability of exploitation. Assuming feasibility is constant across both types of opportunities, the desirability of pursuing a commercial opportunity or a social opportunity may also differ.

While recognizing desirability may occur for a number of reasons (for example, Cyert and March, 1963), one important consideration in the commercial entrepreneur’s decision making processes is the fi nancial impact. By comparison, a primary motivator for the prospective social entrepreneur is social value creation for the marginalized. But, why are prospective social entrepreneurs drawn to the marginalized? For centuries, the role of emotion in prosocial human action has been studied (for a brief review, see Eisenberg and Miller, 1987). While there is some debate about whether action is pursued for altruistic or egoistic reasons,1 psychologists generally agree that empathy is a major determinant of prosocial behavior in a wide range of contexts (cf Batson and Coke, 1981; Davis, 1980; Hoff man, 1984).

Empathy is defined as ‘an aff ective state that stems from the comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, and that is congruent with it’ (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987, p. 91). In developing theoretical paths to helping behavior, Batson (1987) developed three paths by which prosocial behavior may occur. The fi rst two paths suggest egoistic motivations for helping behavior (termed reward seeking/punishment avoiding motivation and arousal reducing egoistic motivation). The third path departed from the traditional approach which viewed all intentional action as egoistic and instead presented a path where prosocial behavior occurred for altruistic motivation. This third model, termed empathetically evoked altruistic motivation, off ered a theoretical model linking empathy to prosocial behavior.

Given the increasing empirical evidence supporting the empathy- altruism hypothesis (for example, Batson and Shaw, 1991), we focus on this third path as one possible explanation for engaging social entrepreneurship. According to the model, a precipitating or instigating situation leads a person to begin to adopt the perspective of another. The perspective- taking of another is often related to one’s own self- perspective or the perspective about another’s perceived reaction to similar situations (Batson, 1991). Often, adoption of the perspective of another person takes place in times of trouble or during personal distress of another. As such, the identifi cation with another’s distress leads to a vicarious emotional response of empathy.

This empathetic response may be induced by prior experience in similar situations or a feeling of attachment to the other person (Batson, 1991; Lee and Holden, 1999); and it is related to the magnitude of the other person’s need and the strength of attachment to the other. This attachment can occur for a number of reasons including perceived similarity as well as attractiveness. In turn, this emotion- matching leads to an altruistic motivation to help another.

The basic premise of this hypothesis is that the suff ering of another leads an individual to seek to reduce suff ering for that other not for personal reasons but for altruistic reasons. The arousal of the motivational state leads the individual to embark on a hedonic calculus of the cost–benefi t analysis of helping behavior. The cost–benefi t analysis compares the magnitude of the suff ering of another with the cost associated with engaging in behavior that will reduce or eliminate the suff ering of the other. Such costs may be physical, mental, social, political or financial.

Finally, when the benefi ts outweigh the costs, the individual engages in helping behavior. Such helping behavior is thought to occur ‘if: 1.) helping is possible; 2.) the relative benefi t of helping is perceived to be positive; and 3.) the relative benefi t of helping is perceived to be more positive than the relative benefi t of having someone else help’ (Batson and Shaw, 1991). The empathy–altruism–prosocial behavior model provides an excellent theoretical explanation to understand the decision- making process of a social entrepreneur. While there may be no personal gain (fi nancial or otherwise) for the social entrepreneur, the opportunity to assist another in need represents an important foundation from which to build a theory that explains the motivations of the social entrepreneur. Given its potential importance, we now examine how the model itself may be useful for social entrepreneurship education.
Read More : The role of empathy in social entrepreneurship

The role of simulation in social entrepreneurship pedagogy

Given its infancy, the fi eld of social entrepreneurship education is still developing. To begin to educate students about social entrepreneurship, several pedagogical approaches have been suggested (see Brock et al., 2008). However, one important approach that has been overlooked is the use of a simulation. One possible reason for this neglect is that the relative infancy of the fi eld suggests that simulations specifi c to the domain may not yet have been developed. While this might be the case, it may be possible to draw upon simulations used in other fi elds to specifi cally address some of the most salient issues in the field of social entrepreneurship. One such simulation is Star- Power which has been used in a number of fi elds including management for more than three decades.

The purpose of Star- Power as a pedagogical tool is to combine the increased interest, involvement and enthusiasm of simulations, rooted in realism and face validity, with the broader experiential learning  environment (Keys and Wolfe, 1990; Kinnear and Klammer, 1987; McGrath, 1982) in which social entrepreneurship is embedded. According to the director’s instructions, Star- Power is:

A game in which a low- mobility, three tiered society is built through the distribution of wealth
in the form of chips. Once established, the group with the most wealth is given the power to
make the rules of the game. Almost without exception, they make rules which secure and
enhance their position of power. The other two groups generally consider these rules to be
unfair and often label them dictatorial, fascist or racist. Sometimes, there is an open revolt
against the top group, other times the other two groups give up and drop out. When the frustration
and confl ict reaches a certain level, the director ends the game. The experience is then
analyzed and discussed. (Shirts, 1993: 3)

The Star- Power simulation: an overview

In the simulation, students blindly select diff erent colored chips out of a bag that contains a random assortment of diff erent colored chips. The chips each have diff erent point values attached to the color of the chip. The creation of the three tiers occurs as students engage in two rounds of trading chips with other members of the class period based on pre- specifi ed rules. After the fi rst round of trading, the students are divided into three groups based upon the total point value of their fi ve most valuable chips. Each group is then provided buttons which are worn during the balance of the game.2 At the end of each trading session, each group is given three bonus chips which are allocated to individuals within their group based upon a vote from the members.

Then, points are totaled again and adjustments between tiers are made if necessary. Then, students draw chips again but this time the bags of chips provided to each of the three groups are biased with the highest group drawing from a bag containing the majority of higher value chips. After this biased drawing, a second round of trading occurs followed by a second round of awarding of bonus chips. Following this second round of trading, the group of students with the highest scores is given the power to make rules for all subsequent rounds of trading.

To increase the eff ectiveness of the Star- Power simulation, it is important to provide an opportunity for students to refl ect upon their experiences and to share these experiences with the entire class. Following the in class simulation (which can be completed in approximately 75 minutes), the students are given an assignment to write a refl ection paper for the next class session that addresses two questions:

1. How did you feel during the Star- Power simulation?
2. Why did we use this simulation in a social entrepreneurship course?

When the students return for the next class session, the entire discussion is focused around these two questions. The fi rst question addresses issues related to the emotional aspects of the diff erent groups and how these emotions motivated action. By allowing students to hear the experiences from each of the groups, they gain a broader sense of how the emotions may have differed based upon the group in which the student was located and how these emotions impacted individual action and group decision- making. The second question is used to link the learning experience of the simulation with important constructs in social entrepreneurship.
Read More : The role of simulation in social entrepreneurship pedagogy

Schools and their social context

While social disadvantage may not be an excuse for poor achievement in academic terms it certainly is an explanation. As Power et al. (2002: 26) conclude in their study:
[Educational] outcomes in deprived areas are worse than those in non-deprived
areas, whether they are measured in terms of qualification, attendance, exclusions
or ‘staying on’ rates. Inner-city areas in particular feature as having low outcomes.


They go on to point out that in England in the 1990s ‘the gap in outcomes grew rather than narrowed’ (p.64). They also point to the need to reduce the ‘compositional effects that appear to result from high concentrations of disadvantaged students’ (p.65). A significant issue emerges in their conclusion that:
… schools serving deprived populations could do more to ensure better home–school
relations, which appear to be less facilitative than those in schools serving nondeprived
areas. (p.66)


Schools in deprived areas have a great deal in common with schools in nondeprived areas – the same curriculum, assessment regimes, inspection and accountability models, etc. There are significant differences in funding, teacher supply and access to resources but these are not consistent as causal factors. What is consistent is the notion of deprivation.


This raises the question of the nature of the relationship between schools and their communities. Mulford and Silius (2001: 5) found that there was not a direct causal relationship between high community involvement and improving student outcomes:

On the basis of our results, and if a choice needs to be made between working with
and being sensitive to the community and improving home educational environments,
then the latter will have more direct and immediate ‘payoff’ for student
outcomes … Of course, having a strong community focus may be important for
other reasons such as for the development of social capital in the community, especially
in poor inner city and rural communities.


The distinction between family and community is a valid one – the impact of the family is more direct, immediate and sustainable. However the family is a classic manifestation of community. The status, significance and value attached to the family will often be a product of broader, community-based values. The resilience and potency of the family will be a function of generic factors – most significantly social capital.
In their study of the factors influencing the development of young people in the USA, the Search Institute (2000) found what they describe as a ‘crumbling infrastructure’ which has a number of key manifestations:

1. Most adults no longer consider it their responsibility to play a role in the lives of their children outside the family.
2. Parents are less available for their children because of demands outside the home.
3. Adults and institutions have become more uncomfortable articulating values.
4. Society has become more and more age segregated.
5. Socialising systems (e.g. families, schools and congregations) have become more isolated, competitive and suspicious of each other.
6. The mass media have become influential shapers of young people’s attitudes, norms and values.
7. As problems and solutions have become more complex, more of the responsibility for young people has been turned over to professionals.

These symptoms are in stark contradistinction to what would normally be regarded as criteria for an effective community. Amit (2002: 18) offers criteria to describe a community:

People care because they associate the idea of community with people they know,

with whom they have shared experiences, activities, places and/or histories.

Community arises out of an interaction between the imagination of solidarity and

its realisation through social relations.

If there are not the ‘shared experiences’ and the ‘realisation through social relations’ then community cannot be said to exist and the factors identified by the Search Institute can be said to be both cause and effect. What is being described is a paucity of social capital – the lower the level of engagement in a community, the lower the level of social capital, and so the more likely it is that an area will be deprived – not just in economic terms but also in social terms. Social poverty is as negative and destructive as economic poverty. For Putnam (2000: 296–7) there is an absolute link between levels of social capital and success in the education system:

States that score high on the Social Capital Index – that is, states whose residents

trust other people, join organisations, volunteer, vote and socialise with friends –

are the same states where children flourish: where babies are born healthy and where

teenagers tend not to become parents, drop out of school, get involved in violent

crime, or die prematurely due to suicide or homicide. Statistically, the correlation

between high social capital and positive child development is as close to perfect as

social scientists ever find in data analysis of this sort.

Social Capital is essentially about networks, trust, engagement, communication, shared values, aspirations and interconnectedness. High social capital produces the benefits that Putnam describes above. He also points out that ‘social capital appears to be a complement, if not a substitute, for Prozac, sleeping pills, antacids’ (p.289). Social capital appears to be the panacea for the social, psychological and physiological ills of society, and it might even extend to education.

What is clear is that high social capital enhances academic success. Therefore one answer to academic under-achievement might be not just to strive to improve the efficiency of schools but rather to increase social capital. 

Read More : Schools and their social context

Morality and Domains of Social Knowledge

In my education classes, I often start off by asking students to state what they would consider to be the highest, most moral act. Invariably, students propose risking one’s life to save the life of another as the most moral thing a person could do. I then present them with the following scenario and ask whether it is similar to what they had in mind.

A man is waiting at a train station. On his right, about twenty feet away, stands a woman reading a magazine. The man glances to his left to check if a train is coming and sees to his horror that another man, about twenty feet from him, is in a crouched position clearly aiming a gun at the woman. The man is too far away to either push the woman or stop the shooter. So he yells out “duck” as he steps between the shooter and the woman just as the gun is fired. As a result, the bullet intended for the woman strikes him in the arm, saving the woman’s life.

Generally, my students accept this scenario as a rather dramatic instance of what they had in mind. I then ask them to consider the following alternative scene. The same people are on the train platform in the same relative positions as in the first version. However, the man in the middle is in this case unaware of the presence of the gunman. While waiting for the train, he notices that his shoe is untied. Just at the moment that our “hero” bends forward to tie his shoe, the gunman fires at the woman. The bullet hits him in the arm, and the woman’s life is saved.

Despite the fact that the behavior of the “hero” (moving in between the shooter and the woman) and outcome (woman is saved) are the same, my students do not consider the second scenario as a depiction of a moral action. This is because there was no element of moral choice involved in the second set of events. The decision to move forward was unrelated to the moral elements of the situation, and the moral outcome (preservation of life) occurred quite by accident. On the basis of this example, my students conclude that moral action as opposed to an accidental or reflexive behavior requires moral judgment.

Now some objections may be raised to the interpretation the students offer with regard to this example. First, it may be argued that the act of saving someone’s life is an instance of supererogation (performing beyond the call of duty) and is not an example of action based on moral obligation (e.g., to refrain from harming another). This objection does not, however, negate the importance that the students placed on volition as a necessary element of moral action, and no one would argue that the act of saving someone’s life is without moral meaning. A second, and more pointed, objection would be to accept the example as portraying a moral action, but to argue that even in the first instance the person was not acting on the basis of rational choice, but did so out of instinct or emotion. This position makes clear that emotion plays an important role in morality.

Moreover, this interpretation reminds us of how many everyday moral actions seem to take place automatically without reflection. In fact, some recent writers have placed great emphasis on the apparent lack of reflection in everyday moral activity, and have argued that morality is guided by an inherited emotional “moral sense” (Wilson 1993).

The role of affect and emotion in the selection and motivation of moral action will be taken up again more thoroughly in a later chapter. For our purposes here, it is enough to recognize that the fact that a judgment is made quickly, and seemingly without reflection, does not necessarily mean that it was made “unthinkingly.” It takes little reflection, for example, for an adult to answer the question, “How much is one plus one?” The seeming automaticity of the response does not negate the answer as a product of thought, however quickly done.

Similarly, while moral actions may be motivated by emotion, and take place with very little conscious reflection, they always involve an element of thought. This is why we don’t consider the “prosocial” behavior of animals (e.g., placing their own lives at risk in order to protect their young) to be truly moral. We attribute such behavior to instinct rather than to the animal’s morality. Indeed, if our hero were acting solely out of instinct or automatic emotional processing, my students  would not consider his behavior to have had any more “moral” status than that of the man who saved the woman’s life by accident.

At the core of what we mean by morality, then, is knowledge of right and wrong. Conduct is moral if it involves selection of particular courses of action that are deemed to be right. In the above example, if we were to shift our focus from the “hero” to the shooter, we would quickly see that the person’s moral culpability stems from his choice to harm another person.

If it were to turn out that the shooter were delusional and incapable of understanding the meaning of his actions, we would view the events as tragic rather than in moral terms. Thus, while the human experience of
morality may contain many things, such as emotions (which may be rooted in our evolutionary history), the defining element of morality is moral cognition. Moreover, our deliberations about right and wrong are not confined simply to those things we do seemingly automatically out of habit, or out of an emotional sense that a course of action is right. Moral issues are among the most engaging things that people think about.

It isn’t just philosophers who reflect on moral issues. Just about everyone has pondered the morality of various courses of action and reflected upon the moral meaning of personal decisions. This begins very early in life in the context of deciding on issues of fairness among playmates and siblings, and continues into the twilight concerns over death with dignity.
Read More : Morality and Domains of Social Knowledge